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Abstract 
This paper provides a legal-economic assessment of the Panel Report in US – Animals, one of a 
growing list of WTO disputes arising due to problematic conditions under which an importing country 
closes and re-opens its market after an infectious-disease outbreak in an exporting country. The US 
banned imports of beef from Argentina following a 2000 Argentine outbreak of highly contagious 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a disease not found in the United States since 1929. The US refused to 
relax its import ban, and Argentina filed a WTO dispute in 2012, more than six years after its last 
FMD outbreak. Our analysis starts with Argentina’s claim that the gap between its first requests – in 
2002 – to restore its trading rights and no action by the US as of 2012 constituted “undue delay.” We 
rely on simple insights from economic research on asymmetric information problems – moral hazard 
and adverse selection – to describe the difficulties ultimately confronting the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) and the WTO’s SPS Agreement in dealing with problems like FMD. Such an 
environment creates disincentives for socially efficient behavior that were clearly realized in this 
particular episode. The exporting country has an incentive to hide information on outbreaks and report 
being disease-free too quickly, and the importing country has no incentive to quickly undertake the 
costly effort of conducting the necessary inspections to restore the exporter’s market access. Finally, 
we address the Panel Report’s treatment of alleged discrimination that arose both across different 
FMD-impacted countries and across FMD-impacted and non-impacted geographic zones within 
Argentina, and we touch on the Panel Report’s shift in approach regarding the obligation of the US to 
take into account the special needs of developing countries such as Argentina. 
Keywords 
WTO, dispute settlement, SPS Agreement, animal disease 
JEL Classification: F13 
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1. Introduction
*
 
In 2001, the US Department of Agriculture issued a regulation prohibiting the importation of fresh, 
chilled or frozen beef from Argentina. The 2001 import ban was motivated by Argentine outbreaks of 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a highly contagious virus that spreads quickly and causes significant 
pain, distress, and frequently death to animals that contract it. In 2012, more than eleven years after 
the US had closed its export market to Argentine beef, Argentina filed a request for consultations with 
the WTO and launched a formal dispute. This paper provides a legal-economic assessment of the 
Panel Report in the subsequent US – Animals dispute, which observed: 
“Given the virulence and the potential rapid spread of the disease, and the significant direct and 
indirect costs associated with eradication of an outbreak, most countries that have eradicated the 
disease impose strict sanitary measures on imports of animal products.”
1
  
While Argentina and many other countries have experienced FMD outbreaks in recent decades, the 
US has not had a reported case of FMD since 1929. The US maintains a ban from FMD countries on 
the importation of fresh meat and other animal products from cattle, sheep, goats, deer, and swine, as 
these are the species that are susceptible to FMD.
2
 Under US regulations, FMD is presumed to exist in 
all regions of the world except those declared to be free of FMD by the US Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS). APHIS is part of the US Department of Agriculture and is tasked with 
“protect[ing] the health and value of American agriculture and natural resources.”3 
US law permits imports from regions or countries that have not been declared free of FMD 
provided the regions comply with sanitary protocols agreed to with APHIS. For Argentina, the US had 
set forth such protocols in 1997 via 9 CFR 94.21, which included conditions relating to the movement 
and slaughter of cattle and a requirement that “FMD has not been diagnosed in Argentina within the 
previous 12 months.” Between 1997 and 2001, the US imported substantial volumes of Argentine beef 
pursuant to these protocols, but following FMD outbreaks in Argentina beginning in 2000, the US 
repealed the protocols in 2001, leaving Argentine beef subject to the general prohibition on imports 
unless the region is declared FMD-free. 
In 2002 and 2003, Argentina began the process of requesting that the international community – 
including the United States – reopen their markets to Argentine beef exports, claiming that it was now 
once again FMD free. Such requests turned out to be premature; as Table 1 indicates, Argentina 
continued to experience FMD outbreaks until February 2006.  
This dispute concerns the US repeal of 9 CFR 94.21, the US failure over many years to declare any 
regions of Argentina to be FMD-free, and Argentina’s 2012 challenge to those two measures under the 
WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.4 
                                                     
*
 The authors acknowledge useful discussions with Carlo Cantorre, William Cline, Cullen Hendrix, Petros Mavroidis, 
Marc Noland, Dan Sheesley, Ellen Terpstra, and participants at EUI’s WTO Case Law of 2015 Conference. All 
remaining errors are our own. 
1
 Panel Report at para 2.3. 
2
 In the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), see 9 CFR 94.1 “Regions where rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease 
exists; importations prohibited”; updated list of countries are published in APHIS (2016a). 
3
 APHIS (2016b) also indicates, as specific examples that motivate its mission, “if foot-and-mouth disease or highly 
pathogenic avian influenza were to become established in the United States, foreign trading partners could invoke trade 
restrictions and producers would suffer devastating losses.” 
4
 A number of related disputes involving claims under the SPS Agreement have been covered by contributions to this 
series including Horn and Weiler (2003) EC-Asbestos; Neven and Weiler (2006) Japan – Apples; Howse and Horn (2009) 
EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products; Bown and Trachtman (2009) Brazil – Retreaded Tyres; and 
Hoekman and Trachtman (2010) EC – Hormones; and Bown and Hillman (2016) India – Agricultural Products. While 
Argentina raised claims under Article I:1 and XI:1 of the GATT, the majority of its claims were SPS claim. The Panel, 
having found numerous violations of the SPS Agreement, exercised judicial economy and did not address the GATT 
claims. 
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The currently understood international standards for determining which areas of the world are free 
from diseases like FMD began in the early 1990s. At that point, the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) received a mandate from its International Committee, composed of the Delegates of OIE 
Member Countries, to draw up a list of Member Countries, or zones within countries, that would be 
officially recognized as free from certain specific diseases. The procedure applies to four priority 
diseases: rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Each year, the disease-free status of Member Countries is 
reviewed by the OIE and, where appropriate, ratified and published. Argentina was on and off the 
OIE’s FMD “disease free” list at various times during the period examined by the Panel in this case.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some of the salient economic issues 
underlying this dispute, including key export and import markets for beef over the 1996-2015 period. 
This highlights both overall trends and how trade in these products can fluctuate due to economic 
shocks and disease-induced policy shocks. We then turn to how economists approach public policy 
problems associated with FMD by describing it as a set of informational asymmetry problems.  
Section 3 begins our legal-economic assessment of the Panel Report. The first issue involves the 
timing of the US change in policy toward Argentine beef from regions that had been previously 
infected with FMD. The second involves on whom the burden falls for conducting inspections, once 
there has been repeated outbreak episodes and premature claims of disease eradication. We rely on a 
simple economic framework provided by research on informational asymmetry problems to argue that 
the experience detailed in the Panel Report reveals that the OIE and SPS Agreement have not yet 
struck the right balance. In this case they failed to incentivize both accurate information sharing – 
between exporting and importing country governments, regarding the timing of disease outbreaks and 
their resolution – and the appropriate time for re-opening of foreign market for international commerce 
once products were assured to be disease-free. 
Section 4 then turns to a number of other issues arising the report. These include the question of 
discrimination across different FMD-impacted countries and MFN treatment, as well as discrimination 
within Argentina across its different geography areas in order to tackle the issue of regionalization. We 
also briefly comment on the apparent shift in willingness to place more substantial obligations on 
developed countries to take into account the special needs of developing countries. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. The Economics of Beef Markets and National FMD Policies 
This section describes the international trade flows of beef at issue in this dispute and the market 
failures that arise in national markets due to diseases like FMD. 
2.1 The United States’ import market for beef and Argentina’s exports of beef 
In 2015, the United States imported over $6 billion in fresh, chilled or frozen beef products. In real 
terms, as Figure 1 illustrates, US beef imports were more than 3.5 times higher in 2015 than in 1996. 
However, US beef imports also exhibit substantial fluctuations during this period; the US beef-
producing industry itself experienced negative shocks, including four outbreaks of BSE between 2003 
and 2012.
5
 The fact that various foreign markets were closed to US beef exports due to BSE during the 
period also likely contributed to the political efforts that National Cattleman’s Beef Association 
employed between 2003 and 2015 to discourage lifting the ban on imports from Argentina.  
                                                     
5
 This likely had at least two offsetting effects on the US beef market. In certain years, US production was down because 
of BSE, and this served to boost import demand for foreign beef. On the other hand, a number of foreign markets 
remained closed to US beef exports during this period, leaving US produced beef to be sold in local markets, with a 
consequent dampening of demand for imports.  
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US beef imports have also fluctuated in some years in ways that can be tied to major economic or 
animal health shocks, at both the bilateral and multilateral level (see Figure 2). For example, total US 
imports of beef dipped in 2003 partly because of a BSE outbreak in Canada that led to a temporary US 
bilateral import ban. Imports then increased rapidly in 2004 as the ban was lifted. Furthermore, the 
real value of US beef imports also fell by 10 percent in both 2008 and 2009 during the trade collapse 
associated with the global economic crisis. US beef imports rebounded strongly shortly thereafter and 
grew by 138 percent between 2009 and 2015. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, over 92 percent of US beef imports in 2015 derived from only four 
countries – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Mexico. Of these, Canada’s share of the US import 
market has declined considerably – from a peak of 48 percent in 1999 to only 17 percent in 2015.6 
New Zealand’s market share has remained relatively constant, while Mexico and Australia have 
increased their share of the US import market considerably over the period. This may be partially 
explained by the US implementation of free trade agreements which lowered bilateral beef tariffs and 
expanded the quantitative limits of the tariff rate quotas for selected countries. Nevertheless, the fact 
that countries of great geographic distance from the United States – e.g., Australia and New Zealand – 
make up such a sizeable share of the US import market indicates that beef may not be a geographically 
privileged product. Thus it may be possible for Argentina to successfully export beef to the United 
States under the right conditions.
 7
 
Figure 3 also supports this notion by illustrating US imports of beef from a number of smaller 
countries from Latin America. US has considerable beef imports from Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
Despite its own FMD outbreak that cut it exports to the US to zero in 2001, US imports of beef from 
Uruguay rebounded to more than $200 million by 2015. Finally, US imports from Chile – another 
country mentioned in the dispute described below – have remained negligible, despite the fact that 
Chile has been determined FMD free in the 2000s. 
US beef imports from Argentina peaked at roughly $75 million (in 2015 constant dollars) in 1999. 
At that point, Argentina made up 2.7 percent of the US beef import market. Figure 3 also illustrates 
how the Argentina FMD outbreak that triggered the new US import ban in 2001 essentially cut 
Argentina’s exports to the US to zero by 2002. Argentina’s ‘loss’ of $75 million in annual US exports 
is comparable to the average change in trade flows in disputed products between complainants and 
respondents as measured across all WTO disputes surveyed in Bown and Reynolds (2015, Table 3). 
By itself, this suggests there is nothing unusual about Argentina’s complaint. Finally, the figure also 
demonstrates the limited impact of the recent (effective as of October 2014 for Patagonia and 
September 2015 for Northern Argentina) post-WTO panel decisions by the US to reauthorize imports 
from Argentina.  
Figure 4 illustrates both Argentina’s exports of beef to the world over this period and provides 
information on destination-specific exports to certain foreign markets. First, after the FMD outbreak 
beginning in 2000, Argentina’s total beef exports fell 80 percent from two years earlier and bottomed 
out at roughly $150 million in 2001. Once the FMD was addressed and the OIE recognized part of 
Argentina as FMD-free, Argentina’s global beef exports quickly responded. They peaked at nearly 
$1.7 billion in 2009, though they have declined considerably between 2009 and 2015.  
                                                     
6
 Canada’s declining share of the US import market may be associated with a number of factors, including liberalization of 
the US market for live animals (cattle) that has resulted in some reorganization of the North American beef supply chain. 
Furthermore, the US country of origin labeling regulation for meat products – imposed between 2009 and 2015 (Bown 
and Brewster, forthcoming; Greene, 2015) – likely increased US meatpackers’ costs and thus contributed to an increase 
in US import demand over the period (Figure 1). 
7
 It is also worth noting that Argentine beef tends to be grass-fed and thus has a different taste profile from most US beef, 
which is a heavily grain-fed product. High-value beef cuts could command a sufficient price premium as to overcome any 
geographic disadvantage of distance from the US market. 
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Some of the key foreign markets for Argentina’s beef exports may also help to explain its 
frustration with the US pace of addressing its request to resume bilateral exports. Specifically, Figure 
4 shows that in some years since the FMD outbreaks, high-income EU countries such as Germany, 
Netherlands and Italy have combined for roughly 50 percent of total Argentina beef exports; e.g., 
exports to these countries alone were $750 million in 2008.  
Two final points worth noting from Figure 4 are that some important beef export markets for 
Argentina during this period were other emerging economies and that trade with these markets 
involved considerable volatility. For example, the share of Argentina’s exports to Chile and to Russia 
peaked at 23 percent in 1997 and at 35 percent in 2006, respectively; yet in other years those markets 
account for single digit shares of Argentina’s beef exports. Most recently, Argentina has enjoyed 
major export growth to China. As late as 2011 Argentina’s beef exports to China were zero; by 2015 
they were $170 million, or 20 percent of Argentina’s total beef exports.  
2.2 Market failures, informational asymmetry problems due to FMD, and national policies 
Next consider a simple, closed economy model designed to represent Argentina’s domestic market for 
beef in the presence of FMD. In such a model, FMD is a negative externality because an outbreak in 
one farmer’s herd generates costs that go beyond that particular farmer. Because the disease is so 
infectious, an outbreak could easily spread to another farmer’s cattle, thus imposing losses to other 
farmers. The FMD externality indicates that, if left unabated by government policy, market failures are 
likely to arise. Thus there is a potential efficiency-enhancing role for national governments to design 
and implement policies to address FMD.
8
 
Economists typically consider the problems associated with FMD as arising from two essential 
characteristics. First, an FMD outbreak is assumed to occur with some positive probability. Second, 
when an FMD infection actually arises, only sometimes is this information actually known to 
authorities.  
First, even though FMD will occur with some positive probability, the nature of the disease implies 
that farmers can reduce its likelihood if they undertake costly investment in biosecurity measures. 
Such investments might include limiting herd movement, reducing inbound exposure to outside 
contaminants, and cleansing and disinfecting of premises. However, since not all benefits of the costly 
investment accrue to the farmer – i.e., recall that one farmer’s effort to thwart a potential FMD 
outbreak provides externality benefits to other farmers – any individual farmer will tend to invest in 
prevention only up to the point that it makes sense from a private (profit-maximizing) perspective. The 
existence of investment benefits that spill over beyond the farmer into society implies that markets on 
their own will fail unless governments intervene with the appropriately-tailored policy. 
The government could mandate that the farmer undertake such investments through law, or it could 
even incentivize such investments through subsidies. However, a separate a well-known real world 
problem arises when governments implement such policies in practice: the informational asymmetry 
associated with the farmer’s effort to ‘comply’ with the policy. In practice, how does the government 
know if the farmer is actually following the biosecurity protocols? Government monitoring of 
individual farmers to prevent shirking is too costly. In economics, this informational asymmetry leads 
to what is called a “moral hazard” (hidden action) problem.9 
                                                     
8
 This section draws heavily from Wolf (2013), which provides a very useful introduction to the economic incentive 
problems facing policymakers in the event of the infectious diseases affecting cattle. Motivation for the indemnity policy 
discussion that follows is that Argentina’s Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (SENASA) issued indemnity payments to 
farmers during the period of this FMD outbreak; Rich (2005, p. 12) provides a discussion. 
9
 The classic example of moral hazard arises in the design of car insurance. If the car is fully insured, and since the driver’s 
actions cannot be perfectly monitored, a driver has insufficient incentive to park it in a safe area or to avoid accidents. A 
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Second, it is possible that FMD episodes may sometimes go undiscovered by anyone aside from 
the farmer. Certainly the farmer is in the best position to observe and report it, and the more quickly 
the FMD is reported to the government, the more quickly the outbreak can be contained and the 
societal costs limited. However, again, a market failure can arise due to the divergence between social 
costs and private costs to the farmer associated with whether and how quickly she reports an outbreak. 
If she reports the FMD, she will experience losses to her herd with certainty. If she does not report 
FMD, there is a chance she will be able to get away with it and experience smaller losses – e.g., 
perhaps only partial loss of a herd. And yet if she does not report FMD, there is a greater chance that 
the outbreak spreads and imposes greater external costs to society. 
In the absence of any policy intervention, the market equilibrium outcome of this problem would 
result in the farmer under-reporting suspected cases of FMD because the failure to notify imposes 
costs to society (FMD outbreaks on other farms) beyond the private costs to the individual farmer. In 
economics, this informational asymmetry leads to what is called a “adverse selection” (hidden 
information) problem.
10
 
Economists typically implement a ‘principal-agent’ framework to evaluate the implications of 
policies designed to address the economic incentives created by such informational asymmetries. The 
government (the principal) represents the national or societal interest and seeks to design a policy that 
would incentivize the farmer (the agent) to act in the societal best interest, as opposed to the farmer’s 
own private interest alone.  
Gramig, Horan, and Wolf (2008) develop a formal model that includes both of these informational 
asymmetries to examine the tradeoffs associated with FMD. In particular, they examine the 
implications of a government having access to an indemnity payment program, which is a policy that 
guarantees to pay a farmer a set price in the event that the farmer truthfully reports an outbreak of 
FMD. One critical element is the size of the guaranteed payment relative to the expected costs to the 
farmer of the lost herd due to the government response (e.g., culling) and lost business once the FMD 
outbreak is publicized. 
Their baseline analysis reveals two offsetting effects of a guaranteed indemnity payment program. 
First, providing a higher guaranteed payment does encourage farmers to report the outbreak of FMD; 
this helps to address the adverse selection problem. But second, a higher payment decreases the 
incentive for farmers to undertake the biosecurity investment necessary to prevent an FMD outbreak in 
the first place. Because the farmer is more likely to be fully compensated for an FMD outbreak, a 
higher guaranteed payment exacerbates the moral hazard problem.  
Put differently, a lower guaranteed indemnity payment addresses the moral hazard problem as it 
places more of the burden on the farmer to incentivize their investment in biosecurity. However, the 
lower payment suggests that the farmer is less likely to report if she discovers an actual FMD episode. 
The low payment increases the incentive for the farmer to try to get away with it unnoticed, and the 
adverse selection (hidden information) problem is exacerbated.  
Therefore, one of the important insights of the Gramig-Horan-Wolf approach is that when there are 
two separate informational asymmetry problems – such as what arises in the national context with 
FMD – a “one-size-fits-all” public policy of a single indemnity payment scheme does not provide the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
solution to the problem was for insurers to issue deductibles, so that some of the risk burden was shifted back onto the 
driver that would thus induce the driver to engage in behavior jointly beneficial to the driver and the insurer. 
10
 The classic example of adverse selection arises in the market for used cars and is referred to as the ‘lemons’ problem 
(Akerlof, 1970). The informational asymmetry problem in the used car market is that buyers cannot tell whether the used 
car being offered to them is high quality or low quality (a lemon). Because of this unobservability, the consumer offers a 
price that is the average between the low and high quality types of cars. But since this price is less than the valuation of 
the high-quality car, potential sellers of high quality cars will exit the market. Thus, the only market transactions that 
occur end up being for low-quality cars. 
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government enough firepower to create the right incentives for farmers. They show that access to a 
second policy to complement the indemnity – such as an appropriately sized “fine” for failure to report 
a disease – is required if the goal is to elicit both the socially appropriate level of farmer biosecurity 
investment and the socially optimal level of FMD reporting. 
It is clear from the US – Animals dispute – as we further detail below – that Argentina’s public 
policy was not able to quickly or effectively deal with its FMD outbreak. This episode revealed 
problems with both its investment in biosecurity and with its truthful, accurate, and timely reporting. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the Panel Report itself was not directly concerned with Argentina’s 
ex ante design or ex post implementation of its indemnity payments or other public policy toward 
FMD. The Panel was tasked with evaluating the US failure to reopen its market to Argentina’s beef 
exports.  
Nevertheless, this simple model also highlights how informational asymmetries created by the 
possibility of an FMD outbreak pose significant challenges for the design of not only national, but also 
global policies. This then suggests an important role for the OIE and the WTO’s SPS Agreement to 
address the incentives faced by importing and exporting countries, as well as the exporting country’s 
own (domestic) policies, in order to create appropriate incentives for prompt and accurate reporting. 
3. Legal-Economic Analysis: Undue Delay and the Burden of Proof 
This section provides our assessment of the main issues arising in the US – Animals Panel Report. 
Table 2 summarizes the main claims in the dispute and the Panel’s key determinations. 
3.1 The timing of US market reopening and the issue of undue delay 
Argentina’s first major contention in the 2012 dispute was that the US delay in responding to its 
request to resume import protocols for beef from Northern Argentina and for recognition of Patagonia 
as FMD-free were “undue” and therefore violated the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). In particular, Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement 
requires that an importing country’s control, inspection and approval procedures “are undertaken and 
completed without undue delay and in no less favorable manner for imported products than for like 
domestic products.” As additional context, Argentina also claimed that it was discriminated against 
given that the US took only two years to approve imports from Uruguay after its last outbreak of FMD, 
while Argentina’s approval had not been considered at the time of the establishment of the Panel, or 
nearly seven years after its last FMD outbreak.
11
  
The US pointed to a number of delays that it said were caused by Argentina’s Servicio Nacional de 
Salud Animal (SENASA’s) slow responses to requests for information, to changes in Argentina 
relating to surveillance regulations and slaughterhouse standards, to time needed to respond to the 
FMD outbreaks that did occur, to a labor strike at SENASA in 2005, and to US laws on regulatory 
flexibility and paperwork reductions.  
The arguments and the Panel’s analysis raise a number of questions. What is the appropriate 
benchmark for measuring what constitutes “undue” delay? If any errors or delays have occurred in the 
                                                     
11
 The arguments were slightly different for exports from Northern Argentina versus those from Patagonia. For Northern 
Argentina, the request was simply to reinstate the privileges Argentina had from 1997-2001 to import pursuant to specific 
protocols because much of the scientific work was done prior to 1997 and no outbreaks had occurred since 2006. For 
Patagonia, the request was to declare Patagonia (both Patagonia North and Patagonia South) to be FMD-free, based on 
the fact that there had been no FMD outbreaks in Patagonia South since 1976 and the OIE had continuously recognized it 
to be FMD free since 2002, while Patagonia North had not had an outbreak since 1994 and had been declared FMD free 
by the OIE since 2007. 
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exporting country, do they justify further delays by the importing country? If there has been political 
interference in the process, is that an automatic violation of Annex C of the SPS Agreement? 
At the outset, the Panel noted the US claim that not every delay in undertaking or completing an 
approval procedure is contrary to the provisions of Annex C(1)(a). The Panel also noted the US claim 
that the length of the approval process for Argentine exports conducted by other WTO members is not 
a reliable benchmark. Instead, the Panel accepted the interpretation by the panel in EC—Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products that a “delay” is “a period of time lost by inaction or inability to 
proceed” and further noted that OIE guidelines and the US’s APHIS standard processing times serve 
as important indicators of a reasonable length of time.
12
 (Para 7.117).  
The Panel then engaged in a two-part analysis. First, it determined that there were delays in both 
the approval process for permitting beef imports from Northern Argentina and in the process of 
granting FMD-free status to Patagonia. Second, in order to assess whether the delay was “undue” – i.e., 
unwarranted, or otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable – the Panel examined each US 
justification. It concluded that three of four periods of delay were not justified, but that one was, given 
SENASA’s delay in providing information in response to reasonable US requests. For one period 
(time between proposed rule to permit imports and promulgation of final rule), the Panel assessed 
whether a period of over one and a half years was reasonable. The Panel noted that it took APHIS only 
four to 13 months to assess whether to permit imports from Uruguay, Santa Catarina (a region in 
Brazil) and Japan, concluding that a period of over one year was “neither ordinary nor expected.” 
(para. 7.154). Here, the Panel faulted the US for a process that falls outside of the “ordinary” while 
recognizing that APHIS does not have a clearly articulated timeline by which to judge its 
determination. The Panel may have been influenced by the US having taken no action to re-open to 
Argentine beef despite nearly thirteen years having passed since Argentina’s initial November 2002 
request. 
A further source of comfort to the Panel appears to come from its perception that APHIS may have 
slowed down its process due to political pressure from the US Congress. In 2009, the Congress passed 
the Omnibus Appropriations Act which prohibited the payment of the salaries or expenses of any 
person for any activities that would allow imports of meat from Argentina until the US Secretary of 
Agriculture had reviewed US animal health aspects of the proposal to permit Argentine imports and 
issued a report to the Congress on his findings. Argentina consistently pointed to the passage of this 
Act as evidence that the delay was not supported by scientific considerations, but rather was due to 
political pressure on APHIS. 
3.2 Burden of proof 
This dispute also revealed a clear tension raised by the SPS Agreement concerning the allocation of 
the burden of proof. The SPS Agreement places the burden on the importing country. Yet, in this 
episode, Argentina was required to demonstrate the absence of FMD, the maintenance of effective 
surveillance techniques, and the ability to sequester the disease so that it does not spread across 
regions. On the other hand, US law required that the US rely on its own procedures, including its own 
on-site inspections, to determine that Argentina had adequately done so. 
The SPS Agreement was brought into the WTO as part of the Uruguay Round’s “single 
undertaking.” Only 43 Contracting Parties had signed on to the Tokyo Round’s Standards Code which 
contained pre-WTO disciplines on SPS measures.
13
 The new SPS agreement stemmed in part from the 
perception that the Standards Code had failed to stem disruptions of trade in agricultural and food 
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 Panel Report, EC—Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1495. 
13
 For a discussion of the history of the SPS and TBT agreements and their relationship to the GATT, see Marceau and 
Trachtman (2006). 
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products and that the standards in place were too widely divergent across countries. The new SPS 
Agreement became binding on all WTO members.  
The SPS Agreement places the initial burden on those importing countries that impose SPS 
measures, requiring that any measures adopted be applied only to the extent necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, are based on scientific principles, and do not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between Members. But this means countries wishing to export to such 
countries must have in place their own internal SPS systems, and maintain sufficient records and 
administrative support to demonstrate that their agricultural products are in compliance with all of the 
requirements of the importing Member’s SPS measure. While the SPS Agreement and its Annex C 
place the burden for control, inspection and approval on the importing member, an extensive burden 
also falls on the exporting country. And the burden can effectively shift from the importing country to 
the exporting country following an outbreak of a contagious disease.  
Argentina and the US both bore some of the initial burden for conducting a risk assessment in 1997, 
long before the more recent FMD outbreaks and WTO dispute. They worked in the 1990s to craft a set 
of mitigating protocols to bring imports of Argentine beef into compliance with US standards for 
protection against FMD, with Argentina continually required to certify that its exports met the 
requirements and to notify the US (and the OIE) of any potential outbreaks. The risk assessment and 
protocol opened up the US market to Argentine beef between 1997 and 2001. As we observed from 
Figure 3, US imports of beef from Argentina increased to $75 million annually during this period. 
When cattle from neighbouring countries were illegally imported into Argentina and outbreaks of 
FMD began occurring in 2000, the US banned further imports and effectively shifted the burden back 
to Argentina to prove that it was able to control for FMD. Argentina then requested that APHIS come 
for site visits, both in Patagonia and Northern Argentina, and Argentina was required to provide 
extensive information and data in advance and as follow-up to each of the five site visits that did occur 
between the fall of 2000 and February of 2009.
14
 However, as the record makes clear, there were often 
long intervals between such visits, with repeated requests by Argentina for the visits to occur, as they 
were a prerequisite to obtain approval either to resume beef exports or to be declared FMD free. 
However, even Argentina’s initial request may have been premature. Argentina sought authorization 
to export beef to the US in November 2002 pursuant to the 1997 protocols– even though sporadic 
outbreaks of FMD continued to arise, particularly in Northern Argentina, until 2006.  
This dispute also raises questions on the burden borne by exporting countries and the incentives 
associated with costs for both compliance and inspection. The US incurred a significant burden to 
perform a full risk assessment in the course of promulgating a final rule in 1997 to permit the initial 
imports of Argentine beef. That rule was clearly tied to commitments made by the US as part of the 
Uruguay Round and the adoption of the SPS Agreement in 1994.
15
 The rule was preceded by site visits 
to Argentina, the promulgation of a proposed rule to permit Argentine imports, a 150-day comment 
period, four public hearings in four cities throughout the US, and responses to the 113 comments 
received.
16
 The final rule was accompanied by an assessment of economic impact of permitting 
imports from Argentina and contained certain specific “mitigating measures,” including that the meat 
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 The site visits noted in Appendix 1 of the Panel Report were: 1) September 27-October 6 2000, APHIS in conjunction 
with OIE staff , visited to gather information for a risk assessment following a number of outbreaks, 2) December 1-5, 
2003, APHIS and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency conducted a site visit in Patagonia, 3) May 30-June 3, 2005, 
APHIS conducted a site visit in Northern Argentina, 4) September 6-8, 2006, APHIS visited the areas affected by FMD 
outbreaks, and 5) February 23-26, 2009, APHIS conducted a site visit to Patagonia.  
15
 The background to the final rule states: “In proposing the amendment to the regulations [to permit imports from 
Argentina], we stated that we considered the proposed regulatory changes to be consistent with and to meet the 
requirements of international trade agreements that had recently been entered into by the United States.” 62 Fed.Reg. 
34385 (June 26, 1997). 
16
 See 62 Feg. Reg 34385-34394 (June 26, 1997) and 61 Fed Reg 16978-17105 (April 18, 1996). 
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had to come from premises where FMD had not been present during the prior 12 months, where the 
cattle had not been vaccinated for FMD (which masks the symptoms), and all bone and lymphoid 
tissue was removed before exportation.  
Following more than two thousand FMD outbreaks that occurred in Argentina in 2000 and 2001, 
how many of these steps should the US be required to undertake all over again? Viewed differently, 
what should Argentina be required to do in advance of requesting renewed access to the US? The SPS 
Agreement does not address the issue, other than Annex C’s general placement of the burden for 
control, inspection and approval on the importing country and its requirement that any fees charged for 
procedures performed are not discriminatory as between domestic and imported products. 
Both sides attempted to use the 1997 ruling to their advantage. Argentina claimed that little had to 
be done to reinstate its previous status, since so much work had gone into the 1997 final rule. The US 
contended that its delays were justified by the substantial new data and extensive new work required in 
light of the thousands of FMD outbreaks.  
Argentina also urged reliance on OIE’s various recognitions of particular regions in Argentina as 
FMD-free as grounds to claim that the US did not need to start its assessment from scratch. Clearly, 
reliance on OIE as an independent international organization responsible for health standards for 
international trade in animals and animal products could be a cost-effective solution to the current 
allocation of the burden to importing countries. But, as this case demonstrates, importing countries are 
likely to be highly resistant to ceding control over inspection or approval procedures. Moreover, OIE 
typically does not perform an on-site inspection itself; its information dissemination role depends on 
the data and responses to questions typically submitted by the exporting country. As we have 
described in Section 2, the existence of informational asymmetries even only at the national level – 
between farmers and the government – can lead to significant market failures.  
The US regards OIE approval as at best a prerequisite for placing a country or region on its list for 
potential site visits. The US generally does not grant an approval for imports following a disease 
outbreak without first successfully completing its own site visit and verification of data and control 
procedures submitted by the exporting country. 
3.3 Generating the right economic incentives in light of these informational asymmetries 
The OIE is an international standards-setting organization supported by its members, which include 
Argentina, the United States, and nearly 180 other countries. It provides global public goods.
17
 
Consider again the basic informational asymmetry problem between the Argentine government and 
its farmers described in Section 2. The OIE supports member country governments that seek to design 
and implement efficient and effective national policies to address FMD. An important OIE role is to 
help Argentina’s government incentivize farmers to invest in biosecurity measures to reduce outbreaks 
while also encouraging them to report outbreaks expeditiously when they arise. 
However, this dispute reveals that the environment created by the OIE and SPS Agreements has not 
yet struck the right balance to ensure that foreign markets reopen in an appropriate and timely manner 
after an FMD outbreak. Two major concerns stand out in particular. 
The first concern is due to Argentina’s lack of credibility in truthfully reporting information. First, 
Argentina was not entirely forthcoming about the initial outbreak. The Panel Report (Appendix 1) 
notes that SENASA “out of concern for maintaining the international status of exports…decided to 
keep the FMD situation confidential until further data would permit a better evaluation of the situation.” 
Second, in July 2003, the OIE faced a request by Argentina to recognize Northern Argentina as FMD-
                                                     
17
 Bown and Hillman (2016) provide a thorough introduction to and discussion of the general, global public good- provider 
role that the OIE plays related to trade in animal products impacted by infectious diseases. 
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free where vaccination is practiced, only to one month later suspend the designation due to new 
outbreaks. This suggests that current OIE incentives are not sufficient to prevent Argentina from 
claiming “too early” that it was FMD-free. Third, the US claimed that Argentina kept changing the 
rules on what could cross the line between Patagonia and North Argentina, as Argentina claimed each 
time that Patagonia had been effectively isolated from the outbreaks in Northern Argentina. Clearly 
the US remained sceptical of Argentina’s ability to control the movement of cattle or beef internally 
and at the border with its neighbours. Overall, this hurt Argentina’s credibility and the resulting lack of 
trust weakens a system reliant on accurate and timely self-reporting to the OIE. 
The second concern is that the OIE could not eventually incentivize the United States to re-assess 
Argentina’s FMD status more quickly to re-open its import market. This could also undermine the 
system if such reticence makes a country like Argentina less likely to report an FMD finding in the 
first place – hoping the finding doesn’t turn into an FMD outbreak and the exporter gets discovered – 
because it is worried about being shut out of foreign markets for an excessive period of time. 
Therefore, a second and separate informational asymmetry made obvious by this dispute is one that 
arises after an outbreak and that involves whether an exporting country like Argentina is truly FMD 
free. This asymmetry is between Argentina’s government and the outside world. As the OIE makes 
clear, this information is critical and relevant because FMD can spread across borders through 
international commerce in both cattle and beef products.  
There are two main problems with the current incentive structure. First, it places most all of the 
costs of determining whether the exporting country (Argentina) is FMD free on the importing country 
(the United States). Furthermore, much of the benefits of being deemed FMD-free would be enjoyed 
by the exporting country (Argentine beef producers). This over-incentivizes the exporting country 
(Argentina) both to shield information on outbreaks and to potentially request FMD-free status, even 
when it is not, because there are expected benefits from the change in status and no explicit costs to 
the exporter when requesting the status change. Second, there is no explicit alternative for the OIE or 
Argentina to incentivize the importing country (the US) to speed up the costly process of undertaking 
a new scientific analysis even if Argentina’s truthfulness had not been an issue. As this episode 
illustrates, Argentina’s only recourse was to file a formal dispute in which it would eventually be 
authorized to retaliate (impose costs on the US) if the importer refused to comply. 
One proposal would be to institutionalize a system that would have more burden- (cost-) sharing 
between the exporting and importing country in covering the costs of such inspections. If the act of 
requesting an inspection entailed some cost to the exporting country, this would help alleviate the 
informational asymmetry problem that the exporter requests foreign inspections too soon – i.e., before 
it is actually FMD-free. When reputational effects are important, an apparent abuse of asymmetric 
information can also hurt the credibility of its regulators with the outside world. While more analysis 
is needed to fully evaluate such a proposal, the intuition is that it would work like a deductible in an 
insurance contract. Under moral hazard, sharing the cost burden may help to better align the incentives 
of the importing and exporting countries. 
4. Additional Issues Raised in the Panel Report 
4.1 Discrimination 
Like the rest of the WTO Agreements, the SPS Agreement (Article 2.3) contains provisions 
prohibiting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between WTO Members where similar conditions 
prevail.  
Argentina claimed that the US measures arbitrarily discriminated against Argentina both 
substantively and procedurally. The first substantive claim of discrimination compared US imports 
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from Uruguay with those from Northern Argentina, since both regions had FMD outbreaks at roughly 
the same time, both were recognized by the OIE as FMD-free where vaccination is practiced, and both 
had similar physical situations and institutional structures for dealing with FMD. The second claim 
compared Chile and Santa Catarina (a state in southern Brazil) for imports of animal products from 
Patagonia since all three regions had their last FMD outbreaks around the same time and the OIE 
recognized all as FMD-free where vaccination is not practiced.  
Argentina’s procedural claims were that the US maintained a prohibition on imports from Northern 
Argentina and Patagonia for more than a decade while other WTO Members were given risk 
assessments quite rapidly after having outbreaks and were “given import permission accordingly.” 
Argentina specifically cited Uruguay, which had an FMD outbreak in 2001 but was allowed to export 
beef to the US less than two years later in 2003; the UK is currently on the APHIS list of FMD-free 
regions despite outbreaks in 2000-2001 (same as Argentina) and again in 2008; Japan is likewise on 
the APHIS FMD-free list despite an outbreak in 2010, which was followed by a risk assessment 
conducted just one year after the outbreak.  
The US contended that the conditions in Argentina were not similar to those in Uruguay, Santa 
Catarina or Chile, citing differences in the geographical size of area and the size of herds in the 
various regions, the geography and length of land-borders over which FMD could be spread, the 
volume of veterinary resources available to check for and treat FMD, and the recent FMD history. The 
US also emphasized that Argentina intentionally kept the full extent of the 2000-2001 FMD outbreaks 
confidential while at least Uruguay promptly reported its outbreaks. The US rejected common OIE 
recognition as sufficient to conclude that similar conditions prevailed in the various regions because 
the OIE did not take into account whether the region accepted imports from FMD-infected regions, or 
the region’s veterinary capacity to detect, prevent and control FMD. 
In analyzing the competing claims, the Panel engaged in a three-part analysis of Argentina’s claims 
of discrimination. The first considered whether similar or identical conditions prevail between the two 
regions. The second examined whether the US measures discriminate between the two regions. The 
third addressed whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable. The Panel ultimately answered 
each question in the affirmative for two of Argentina’s claims of discrimination, but found that 
Argentina had not demonstrated that similar conditions prevail between Northern Argentina and 
Patagonia compared to either the UK or Japan and hence found no violation of Article 2.3 for the UK 
and Japan claims.  
For the first step in the analysis, the Panel stated that the test for similar conditions prevailing was 
whether the risk of FMD-introduction posed by imports from the two regions and their ability to meet 
the US Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) if subject to comparable mitigating protocols is the 
same. The Panel recognized that finding similar conditions in two countries required not only an 
assessment of disease-prevalence at a given point in time but also of the “credibility” of the sanitary 
measures in place to prevent and control FMD, including the veterinary capacity and infrastructure for 
control. In assessing whether any discrimination found to exist was “arbitrary or unjustifiable,” the 
Panel looked to whether the distinction between the two sets of imports “bears a rational connection to 
the objective” of the measures. For both of the claims where the Panel found discrimination, one key 
factor was its prior finding of “undue delay”, thereby suggesting that procedural discrimination can 
affect the outcome of a substantive discrimination determination.  
The Panel’s analysis also raises the question of just how similar conditions have to be in order for a 
claim of discrimination to prevail. Obviously in the SPS context, identical conditions are almost never 
going to occur, as the size of the land, number of animals, concentration of animals and number of 
veterinarians is always going to vary from state to state and region to region. Here, the variance with 
Uruguay was arguably quite large yet the Panel found similar enough conditions to warrant finding 
discrimination. 
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4.2 Regionalization 
This dispute, like a number of the recent SPS cases, raises the issue of how and when importing 
countries must “adapt” to regional conditions, including pest- or disease-free areas that arise in 
exporting countries.
18
 This is addressed in both Article 6 of the SPS Agreement and the OIE’s 
Terrestrial Code. Article 6 in particular places a burden on importing countries to recognize regions or 
areas that are disease-free, specifies some of the factors that are to be considered in determining the 
existence of such areas, and then places a burden on exporting members claiming such regions to 
provide evidence of the region’s disease-free status. 
Here Argentina contended that the US refusal to recognize Patagonia as FMD-free or to permit 
imports of animals or animal products from Patagonia constituted a violation of Article 6.1. Argentina 
claimed that the US failed to take into account: the level of prevalence of FMD in Patagonia South, 
which has been FMD-free since 1976, or Patagonia North, which has been FMD-free since 1994; the 
eradication and control programs put in place by SENASA; and the criteria and guidelines developed 
by OIE, which had recognized the FMD-free status of Patagonia South in 2002 and Patagonia North in 
2007.  
The US claimed that it was still in the process of adjusting its measure at the time of establishment 
of the Panel, as APHIS was still engaged in information exchanges with SENASA and was uncertain 
as to whether Argentina objectively demonstrated that Patagonia was, and was likely to remain, FMD-
free. The US rejected Argentina’s claim that the OIE FMD-determination constituted a “criteria or 
guidelines” under Article 6.1. The US claimed that its regulations meet the criteria of Article 6.2 but 
that once Argentina sought US recognition of Patagonia as FMD-free and the process of evaluating 
that claim began, the existing US ban on imports was transformed into a provisional measure under 
Article 5.7 of the SPS, which requires that the US review its measure within a reasonable period of 
time. The US claimed that it was doing just that when the Panel was established. 
The Panel, largely based on its previous findings concerning undue delay, found that the US had 
indeed violated Article 6.1. The Panel noted its finding that APHIS itself was satisfied that it had 
sufficient information concerning the FMD situation in Patagonia to conclude its review in 2009.
19
 As 
a result, the Panel found both that the US had not completed its review without undue delay, in 
violation of Article 8 and Annex C and that it had not reviewed the “provisional” measure within a 
reasonable period of time within the meaning of Article 5.7.  
4.3 Special Consideration for Developing Countries 
Argentina also claimed that under Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement, the US must give developing 
countries a priority in the queue for inspections, risk assessments and rulemakings. Argentina 
indicated that in this case, the US acted with alacrity in re-opening access to the US market for beef 
from the UK and Japan, while failing to act on Argentina’s request for more than nine years, thereby 
violating Article 10.1. The US claimed that Argentina never identified any particular special need 
related to its developing country status and therefore cannot now claim that the US failed to address 
such unidentified needs. 
                                                     
18
 This is also an issue in the ongoing Russia – Pigs (EU) dispute. Bown and Hillman (2016) provide a discussion of a 
number of legal-economic issues that arise concerning regionalization as seen through the lens of the India-Agricultural 
Products dispute. 
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 The Panel specifically noted after the 2009 site visit, APHIS did not request any additional information from SENASA 
concerning the FMD situation in Patagonia, that on April 27, 2009, APHIS sent a letter to SENASA stating that no 
additional information was required, and in June and October 2011, the US stated in meetings of the SPS Committee that 
APHIS had concluded that imports from Patagonia presented a negligible risk of FMD. 
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The Panel started by stating explicitly that Article 10.1, notwithstanding its somewhat vague “take 
account of” language, creates an enforceable obligation on the US. The Panel largely agreed with the 
US. In doing so, the Panel subtly shifted the burden of proof from prior reports that had placed the 
burden squarely on the developing country to prove its claim that the importing country did not take 
account of developing country Members’ needs, such as in EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products. Here, the Panel expressly provided for a shift in the burden to the importing country to show 
how it took account of the special needs of the developing country if the developing country 
demonstrates that its special needs were expressly identified and shows a lack of documentation of 
consideration for that special need. Argentina claimed that its special need for priority access to the 
approval process was communicated to the US but the US failed to give Argentina speedier processing. 
The Panel ruled that the phrase “take account of” does not mandate always putting developing 
countries at the front of the line for risk assessments since importing countries must weigh and balance 
a wide variety of interests in determining when and how to conduct its inspections and risk 
assessments and that Article 10.1 cannot be read to require always moving developing countries to the 
front of line.  
5. Conclusion 
This dispute is the 24
th
 case involving trade in cattle-related products – e.g., dairy, beef, hides, etc. – 
indicating the significance of trade frictions in this sector, with SPS measures in particular often 
having a dramatic impact on trade. Indeed, Argentina’s global exports of beef fell by more than 80 
percent in the years following its FMD outbreaks in 2000. While trade with a number of Argentina’s 
partners was restored fairly quickly once the FMD outbreaks ceased and the disease was under control, 
the United States maintained its ban on Argentine imports for nearly 10 years after Argentina 
requested that it be lifted and for nearly seven years after the last outbreak of FMD was detected 
anywhere in Argentina. This led Argentina to eventually initiate a WTO dispute with the United States 
in 2012. 
This prolongation allowed the Panel to find that the US had not completed its procedures without 
“undue delay” despite the lack of any firm timelines in the SPS Agreement itself. And that finding 
contributed to a cascade of additional violations. These included that the US ban was not based on 
international standards, that the ban was not based on a risk assessment, that the ban was 
discriminatory, and that the ban was not applied in accordance with the SPS Agreement. It also may 
have allowed the Panel to duck one of the difficult questions raised in this case: if the OIE designates a 
country or a region as FMD-free, does that constitute an international standard that other WTO 
members must recognize? Does it create any form of rebuttal presumption in favor of recognition?  
The US – Animals dispute also highlights how conflicting incentives continue to arise under the 
current system and remain a problem due to the nature of the informational asymmetries involved at 
the intersection of infectious animal diseases and international trade. As the importing country 
maintaining import controls, the burden was on the US to carry out the necessary procedures to 
determine whether Argentina had returned to FMD-free status. Yet the US had little economic 
incentive to do so, and considerable distrust in the information that Argentine government was 
publicly reporting. This last point appears well justified; the evidence clearly revealed Argentina was 
displaying problematic behavior in its inaccurate announcements regarding the outbreak, spread, and 
containment of the disease. Nevertheless, this behavior is largely consistent with basic the economic 
theory behind informational asymmetries and market failures. In the presence of possible FMD 
outbreaks, exporting countries are over-incentivized to claim that they are disease free – either by not 
reporting an outbreak or by prematurely reporting the successful resolution of an outbreak – even 
when they are not. 
In light of the importance of both infectious diseases and trade in animal products, more thorough 
analysis is needed to carefully consider alternative designs to the public policies and global institutions 
Chad P. Bown and Jennifer A. Hillman 
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tasked with creating the right incentives for these actors. One proposal worth investigating is whether 
a reallocation of the cost burden of exporter recertification partially onto the exporting country would 
better incentivize globally efficient behavior by farmers, as well as exporting and importing country 
governments.  
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Table 1: Timeline and Critical Dates of Interest 
Date  Event 
Elapsed Time 
from Argentina’s 
Request to 
Resume Exports 
(Nov. 2002) 
   
1929 Last outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in US   
Aug. 1997 US authorizes importation of Argentine beef following a June 1997 risk 
assessment and rulemaking 
 
2000-2001 Hundreds of outbreaks of FMD (both O and A types) in various parts of Argentina  
June 4, 2001 US publishes rule prohibiting imports of beef from Argentina (becomes final rule 
on December 11, 2001) 
 
May 2002 OIE recognizes Patagonia South as FMD-free zone   
Nov. 2002 Argentina requests authorization to resume beef exports to US 0 
Dec. 2002-
Aug. 2003 
Meetings and exchanges of information between Argentine and US officials  
July 2003 OIE recognizes northern Argentina as FMD-free without vaccination  
Aug. 2003 Argentina requests APHIS to recognize Patagonia as FMD free 273 days/9 months 
Sept. 2003 Outbreak of Type O in Province of Salta; OIE suspends FMD-free status  
Sept.2003-
2006 
Numerous exchanges of information between APHIS and Argentina’s SENASA, 
number of US visits to Argentina  
 
May 2004 OIE confirms recognition of Patagonia South as FMD-free without vaccination  
   
Feb. 5, 2006 Last outbreak of FMD (in province of Corrientes) noted in the panel record 1,179 days  
Jan. 5, 2007 APHIS publishes proposed rule in Federal Register to change disease status of 
Patagonia South to FMD-free; beginning of 60-day comment period 
1,512 days/4 years 
and 1+ month 
May 22, 2007 OIE reinstates FMD-free status of Northern Argentina and Patagonia North  
Oct. 15, 2008 APHIS proposed site visit in December 2008  
Feb. 2009 APHIS site visit to Patagonia  
  
Feb. 26, 2009 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act passes Congress with language: No funds can 
be used for any activity that would allow the importation of meat from 
Argentina; calls for report to House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
2,295 days/6 years 
and 3+ months 
Apr. 27, 2009 APHIS sends SENASA letter stating that no additional information was required 
to proceed with APHIS rulemaking 
 
Sept. 30, 2009 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act expires  
Summer 2010 Letters exchanged between APHIS and SENASA  
June 30, 2011 US statement before SPS Committee that APHIS had “completed the risk analysis 
regarding the region north of the 42
nd
 parallel and would subsequently draft a 
proposal to allow importation of beef under certain conditions.” 
3,150 days/8 years 
and 7+ months 
Oct. 19, 2011 US statement before SPS Committee that APHIS had “completed the assessment 
and was drafting a proposal to allow the importation of beef under conditions.” 
3261 days/8 years 
and 11+ months 
   
Aug. 30, 2012 Argentina requested consultations about the US ban on its beef exports. 3,577 days/9 years 
and 9+ months  
 
Dec. 6, 2012 Argentina requested the establishment of a panel  
Jan. 28, 2013 DSB established the Panel  
July 24, 2015 Final panel report circulated  
Aug. 31, 2015 Panel report adopted 4,673 days/12 
years and 9+ 
months 
Source: compiled by the authors from Panel Report and minutes of the SPS Committee. 
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Table 2: Legal Elements of US – Animals 
SPS Agreement Provision Claims by parties Panel determination 
Article 8 and Annex C--
requirement to complete 
procedures without 
“undue delay” 
Argentina: Nearly 10 years to process request to 
resume imports is “undue” 
US: Argentina outbreaks and failure to provide 
information caused some of delay 
Violation of Article 8 and Annex C; 
delay was undue 
Article 3.1—requirement 
to base measures on 
international standards 
(i.e., OIE Terrestrial 
Code) 
Argentina: US measure not based on OIE guidelines 
for imports from FMD-free regions (w/ or w/out 
vaccinations)  
US: OIE designation of region as FMD free is not 
“international standard” per 3.1 of SPS Agreement 
Violation of 3.1 and 3.3: OIE 
permits trade in beef from countries 
in which vaccination against FMD 
occurs; did not reach whether OIE 
recognition is international 
standard; violation of 3.3 b/c 
violation of Art 8 and Annex C, 5.1, 
2.2, 5.6, 2.3, 6.1 and 1.1 
Article 5.1 and Article 
2.2—requirement for a 
risk assessment 
Argentina: No risk assessment was done; If no risk 
assessment was done, automatic violation of 2.2, US 
ALOP not clear and varies by country 
US: 2001 regulations (ban) was based on risk 
assessment; OIE—FMD extremely dangerous and 
contagious; before trade, importing country must be 
satisfied that its animal health status will be 
adequately protected  
Violation of 2.2 because violation 
of 5.1; no risk assessment 
Article 5.4 –ALOP 
should take into account 
objective of minimizing 
negative trade effects 
Argentina: US has no coherent ALOP 
US: Art 5.4 is not mandatory 
No finding b/c no affirmative 
obligation in Art. 5.4 
Article 5.6—requirement 
that measures not be more 
trade restrictive than 
necessary 
Argentina: US could have used OIE TC or 9 CFR 
94.22 which is less trade restrictive 
US: insufficient evidence for less restrictive 
alternative; OIE TC not OK b/c US doesn’t accept 
vaccination 
Violation: US could have used 
protocols in 9 CFR 94(1)(a) 
Article 2.3—requirement 
not to discriminate 
arbitrarily between 
different WTO Members 
Argentina: permits imports from Uruguay but not 
Northern Argentina; permit imports from Santa 
Catarina and Chile but not Patagonia 
US: regions are different; Argentina intentionally kept 
outbreaks confidential 
Violation: discrimination against 
Northern Argentina and Patagonia 
vs. Uruguay, Santa Catarina and 
Chile 
Article 6.1—requirement 
to adapt measures to 
regional conditions 
Argentina: US required to recognize Patagonia as 
FMD-free, OIE had already recognized 
US: still in process of adapting to regional conditions 
at time of panel request 
Violation: undue delay and failure 
to adapt to regional conditions 
Article 10.1—
requirement to take into 
account special needs of 
developing countries 
Argentina: US should made doing risk assessment for 
Argentina as developing country a priority 
US: does take developing status into account 
No violation: Argentina did not 
satisfy burden of proof 
Article 1.1-SPS measures 
should be applied in 
accordance with SPS 
Agreement 
Argentina: If violate other provisions of SPS 
Agreement, then violate Article 1.1 
US: No response 
Violation 
GATT Article 1-MFN Argentina: MFN violation Not necessary to rule since found 
violations of SPS Agreement 
GATT Article XI.1-no 
quantitative restrictions 
Argentina: ban on imports is quantitative limit Not necessary to rule since found 
violations of SPS Agreement 
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Figure 1. Total US Beef Imports, 1996-2015 
 
 
Source: constructed by the authors with data from USITC Dataweb for fresh and chilled beef 
(HTS 0201) and frozen beef (HTS 0202). 
 
Figure 2. Shares of the US Import Market for Beef, 1996-2015 
 
 
Source: constructed by the authors with data from USITC Dataweb for fresh and chilled beef 
(HTS 0201) and frozen beef (HTS 0202). 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
dollars
(2015, million)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
percent
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Mexico
Uruguay
All others
Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Argentina’s Beef Exports: The WTO’s US – Animals dispute 
19 
Figure 3. US Imports of Beef by Selected Source Country, 1996-2015 
 
 
Source: constructed by the authors with data from USITC Dataweb for fresh and chilled beef 
(HTS 0201) and frozen beef (HTS 0202). 
 
Figure 4. Argentina’s Total Exports of Beef and by Selected Destination Market, 1996-2015 
 
 
Source: constructed by the authors with data from UN Comtrade for fresh and chilled beef (HS 
0201) and frozen beef (HS 0202). 
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